9. Remuneration awarded to the Group Executive Board and share ownership in 2024
9.1 Remuneration awarded in 2024
This section was audited by the external auditor.
In 2024, the members of the Group Executive Board received a total remuneration of TCHF 11,566 (previous year: TCHF10,179). The highest-paid individual in 2024 was Christian Buhl, CEO. The factors impacting the level of remuneration paid are summarised in the explanatory comments to the remuneration table.
The following table shows details of remuneration (gross) for 2024 and 2023:
|
|
2024 |
|
2023 |
||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
C. Buhl CEO |
|
Total |
|
C. Buhl CEO |
|
Total |
||||||||||||||
|
|
CHF |
|
CHF |
|
CHF |
|
CHF |
||||||||||||||
Salary |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||
- Fixed remuneration (excluding representation allowance) |
|
986,804 |
|
3,597,642 |
|
1,026,805 |
|
3,577,638 |
||||||||||||||
- Variable remuneration 1 |
|
924,000 |
|
3,349,240 |
|
720,720 |
|
2,468,090 |
||||||||||||||
Thereof in shares in 2024 2 |
|
|
|
|
|
720,553 |
|
1,811,597 |
||||||||||||||
Shares/options |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||
- Call options MSOP 2024/2023 3 |
|
1,249,976 |
|
3,111,886 |
|
1,112,774 |
|
2,925,715 |
||||||||||||||
- Call options MSPP 2024/2023 4 |
|
94,237 |
|
236,934 |
|
94,221 |
|
220,937 |
||||||||||||||
Non-cash benefits |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||
- Private share of company vehicle 5 |
|
7,932 |
|
42,144 |
|
7,932 |
|
42,144 |
||||||||||||||
Expenditure on pensions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||
- Pension plans |
|
124,645 |
|
762,997 |
|
101,421 |
|
609,911 |
||||||||||||||
- Social insurance |
|
191,812 |
|
454,377 |
|
96,024 |
|
323,516 |
||||||||||||||
- Contribution health/accident insurance |
|
1,512 |
|
11,003 |
|
1,531 |
|
11,137 |
||||||||||||||
Total 6 |
|
3,580,918 |
|
11,566,223 |
|
3,161,428 |
|
10,179,088 |
||||||||||||||
|
Explanatory comments to the remuneration table
- There were seven members in the GEB in 2024 who received compensation for the full year. This compares to seven members in 2023 who received compensation for the full year.
- The fixed compensation paid to the GEB is at a similar level in total compared to the previous year. The fixed compensation of the CEO was reduced by 4% as a result of the change in pay mix, while the other GEB members received an average increase of around 2%.
- The variable remuneration (STP payout) of the CEO increased by 28% in total compared to the amount paid out for performance year 2023, by 39% for the other GEB members and totally by 35%. This reflects the very good company performance in a strongly declining market with all four group financial goals achieved at maximum level and on target achievement of the group ESG goal. The achievement per goal is outlined in the STP performance section below.
- The value of the LTP grant increased by 6% in total compared to the value of the LTP granted in 2023. This reflects the increase to the CEO’s LTP target level to 125% of his annual base salary.
- Pension and social insurance contributions increased due to options being excercised.
9.2 Performance in 2024
This section was not audited by the external auditor.
In 2024, the Geberit Group’s net sales reached the previous year’s level at CHF 3,085 million. Adjusted for negative currency effects of CHF 76 million, the increase was +2.5%, despite the strong decline seen in the building construction industry. The growth was driven entirely by higher volumes. In addition to a rebuilding of inventories at wholesalers in the first half of the year, this increase was primarily due to the expansion of the market position and the strong development of various new products.
Results in 2024 were impacted by the unfavourable currency situation. However, after currency adjustments, the operating results and earnings per share developed positively. While net income was negatively impacted by the higher tax rate due to the OECD minimum taxation law, it still reached the previous year’s level in local currencies. Despite the extremely challenging market environment, operating margins were only slightly below the previous year’s level. The higher sales volumes and lower direct material costs compared to the previous year had a positive impact. In contrast, the high levels of wage inflation in many countries had a negative impact. Furthermore, investments were made in various projects to strengthen the company’s market position. These included growth initiatives in selected developing markets, marketing expenses for the launch of new products and for celebrating the 150th anniversary of the Geberit Group, plus various digitalisation and IT projects.
Overall, operating cashflow (EBITDA) fell by 0.9% to CHF 913 million. However, after currency adjustments this corresponded to an increase of 2.7%. The EBITDA margin decreased by 30 basis points to 29.6%; after currency adjustments, it reached the level of the previous year. Operating profit (EBIT) decreased by 0.9% to CHF 762 million (currency-adjusted +3.2%), corresponding to an EBIT margin of 24.7% (previous year 24.9%). Net income decreased by 3.2% to CHF 597 million (currency-adjusted -0.2%), corresponding to a return on net sales of 19.4% (previous year 20.0%). The reason for the marked decline in net income compared to the operating results was the significantly higher tax rate, which was primarily driven by the OECD minimum taxation law in force since 2024. In terms of earnings per share, the positive effects of the share buyback programmes led to a smaller decline compared to the development of net income. Accordingly, earnings per share decreased slightly by 1.8% to CHF 18.06 (previous year CHF 18.39); in local currencies, this figure increased by 1.3%. Free cashflow decreased by 2.0% to CHF 613 million. The lower operating cashflow and a negative year-on-year development in net working capital were only partially compensated for by the lower investment volume. The free cashflow margin reached 19.9% (previous year 20.3%).
The return on invested capital (ROIC) decreased to 23.0% (previous year 23.6%), mainly due to the higher tax rate driven by the OECD minimum taxation law in force since 2024.
STP performance
The STP performance achievement and payout range for the Group financial performance, ESG performance, and for individual performance is described below. As explained in section 7.4 Disclosure of targets, this represents commercially sensitive information, no further details on the required achievement levels are disclosed.
Group financial business goals and ESG goal achieved in 2024
Performance |
|
|
|
Payout |
||||||||||||||||||||
Group performance goal |
|
Weight |
|
Achievement |
|
|
|
Payout |
|
|
|
Max. |
||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Net sales growth (currency adjusted) |
|
16% |
|
+2.5% |
|
|
|
16% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||
EPS growth |
|
16% |
|
-1.8% |
|
|
|
16% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||
EBITDA margin |
|
16% |
|
29.6% |
|
|
|
16% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||
ROIC |
|
16% |
|
23.0% |
|
|
|
16% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||
CO2 emissions |
|
16% |
|
-0.1% |
|
|
|
8.4% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||
Total weight |
|
80% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||
Total weighted average payout (of ABS 1) |
|
|
|
72.4% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||||||
|
Individual performance remuneration achieved in 2024
In 2024, the Group Executive Board outperformed most of their objectives. Key individual achievements include:
Examples of achievements independent of function |
|
Examples of achievements specific to functions |
||
---|---|---|---|---|
People
|
|
|
|
|
Organisation
|
|
|
||
Culture
|
|
|
The individual performance payout ranged from 15% to 20% of the annual base salary for the GEB members and amounted to 20% of the annual base salary for the CEO.
The overall STP payout percentage including group financial and ESG goals and individual performance ranges from 87.4% to 92.4% of the annual base salary for the GEB members excluding the CEO and amounts to 92.4% of the annual base salary for the CEO. This compares to a payout range of 64.3% to 69.3% for the GEB and to a payout of 69.3% for the CEO in 2023.
LTP performance (MSOP)
The performance period for the performance stock options granted in 2022 under the MSOP was 2022 to 2024. The average ROIC achievement over the three years was 24.4%, which resulted in a vesting level of 43%.
The ROIC performance and payout level at vesting is illustrated below:
9.3 Shareholdings of the Group Executive Board
As of the end of 2024 and 2023, the members of the Group Executive Board held the following shares in the company:
|
|
Maturity |
|
Average exercise price in CHF |
|
C. Buhl |
|
T. Knechtle |
|
R. van Triest |
|
M. Baumüller |
|
M. Ziegler |
|
C. Rapp |
|
A. Lange |
|
Total |
||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
Shareholdings Group Executive Board |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
Shares |
|
|
|
|
|
23,609 |
|
1,462 |
|
2,090 |
|
4,965 |
|
6,602 |
|
2,787 |
|
1,078 |
|
42,593 |
||||
Percentage voting rights shares |
|
|
|
|
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
0.12% |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
Call options 1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
End of vesting period: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
Lapsed |
|
2024–2030 |
|
442.97 |
|
200,925 |
|
0 |
|
58,118 |
|
49,823 |
|
60,629 |
|
40,466 |
|
7,851 |
|
417,812 |
||||
2025 |
|
2032 |
|
584.10 |
|
48,788 |
|
14,911 |
|
12,395 |
|
10,478 |
|
16,203 |
|
13,687 |
|
1,802 |
|
118,264 |
||||
2026 |
|
2033 |
|
504.45 |
|
36,996 |
|
12,501 |
|
9,226 |
|
7,295 |
|
12,111 |
|
10,272 |
|
8,048 |
|
96,449 |
||||
2027 |
|
2034 |
|
527.65 |
|
40,054 |
|
12,354 |
|
9,177 |
|
7,300 |
|
11,777 |
|
10,631 |
|
8,493 |
|
99,786 |
||||
Total options |
|
326,763 |
|
39,766 |
|
88,916 |
|
74,896 |
|
100,720 |
|
75,056 |
|
26,194 |
|
732,311 |
||||||||
Percentage potential share of voting rights options |
|
0.93% |
|
0.11% |
|
0.25% |
|
0.21% |
|
0.29% |
|
0.21% |
|
0.07% |
|
2.07% |
||||||||
|
|
|
Maturity |
|
Average exercise price in CHF |
|
C. Buhl |
|
T. Knechtle |
|
R. van Triest |
|
M. Baumüller |
|
M. Ziegler |
|
C. Rapp |
|
A. Lange |
|
Total |
||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2023 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
Shareholdings Group Executive Board |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
Shares |
|
|
|
|
|
20,024 |
|
887 |
|
2,090 |
|
4,965 |
|
5,928 |
|
2,373 |
|
690 |
|
36,957 |
||||
Percentage voting rights shares |
|
|
|
|
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
< 0.1% |
|
0.11% |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
Call options 1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
End of vesting period: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
Lapsed |
|
2023–2029 |
|
417.63 |
|
174,483 |
|
0 |
|
50,408 |
|
40,930 |
|
46,002 |
|
27,756 |
|
6,281 |
|
345,860 |
||||
2024 |
|
2030 |
|
569.65 |
|
36,784 |
|
0 |
|
11,870 |
|
10,063 |
|
14,907 |
|
12,710 |
|
1,570 |
|
87,904 |
||||
2025 |
|
2032 |
|
584.10 |
|
48,788 |
|
14,911 |
|
12,395 |
|
10,478 |
|
16,203 |
|
13,687 |
|
1,802 |
|
118,264 |
||||
2026 |
|
2033 |
|
504.45 |
|
36,996 |
|
12,501 |
|
9,226 |
|
7,295 |
|
12,111 |
|
10,272 |
|
8,048 |
|
96,449 |
||||
Total options |
|
297,051 |
|
27,412 |
|
83,899 |
|
68,766 |
|
89,223 |
|
64,425 |
|
17,701 |
|
648,477 |
||||||||
Percentage potential share of voting rights options |
|
0.84% |
|
0.08% |
|
0.24% |
|
0.20% |
|
0.25% |
|
0.18% |
|
0.05% |
|
1.84% |
||||||||
|
As of 31 December 2024, and in compliance with the Articles of Incorporation of Geberit AG, there were no outstanding loans or credits between the company and the members of the Group Executive Board, closely related parties or former members of the Group Executive Board.
9.4 Remuneration ratios
In 2024, the average annual fixed compensation of all employees in the Group amounted to CHF 46,907 (excluding the CEO). The ratio of the annual fixed remuneration paid to the CEO to the average annual fixed remuneration of all employees (excluding the CEO) was 21.
For further details, see our Sustainability report.